TCAP Expansion Profile: Ansaru (Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan)

Reasons for inclusion

• Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, commonly known as Ansaru, is a violent Islamist group largely based in northwest Nigeria, which has been designated as a terrorist entity by five designating authorities consulted for the TCAP’s Inclusion Policy.

• Ansaru has carried out deadly terrorist attacks such as a small arms attack on a Nigerian army base on 20 August 2020 in Kaduna State, killing 35 people. The group holds close ties with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) having reasserted their allegiance to Al-Qaeda in 2020, and reportedly continues to work alongside Boko Haram, despite splintering from the group in 2012.

• Ansaru primarily conducts its online propaganda dissemination via a semi-official pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) propaganda outlet in conjunction with Ansaru’s affiliated “Media Center”. While the group has not been consistently active since, it retains the capability to exploit pre-existing pathways and processes to disseminate propaganda content.

Legal status

Threat

Ansaru is a violent Islamist group, formerly part of the broader umbrella group commonly referred to as Boko Haram.[1] The group is historically based in northern Nigeria, largely in the northwest, and reportedly now operates within Birnin Gwari, a local government area in Kaduna state in northwest Nigeria. The group was formed by Khalid al-Barnawi, announcing its "public formation” and break from Boko Haram in flyers distributed in Kano, Nigeria on 26 January 2012. Its stated goal is reviving the Sokoto Caliphate, to reclaim the “lost dignity” of African Muslims, and defend the “interests of Islam and Muslims” in Africa.[2]

Ansaru split from Boko Haram (then under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau) following alleged disagreements over the latter’s indiscriminate killing of civilians, with Ansaru reportedly calling this style of operation “inhuman to the Muslim Ummah.” During the period of 2012-2014, Ansaru carried out targeted attacks on Nigerian military and police personnel. In 2012, Ansaru launched attacks on the Nigerian Anti-Robbery Squad headquarters, and a convoy of Nigerian peacekeepers headed to Mali, in which two soldiers were killed. One of Ansaru’s primary tactics has been the kidnapping of Westerners and politically-connected individuals, which it has carried out since its inception. Ansaru has kidnapped various foreign nationals, including seven foreign construction workers on 16 February 2013, whom they executed the following month.

The United Kingdom was the first to designate Ansaru as a proscribed terrorist organisation in November 2012, describing it as “broadly aligned with” Al-Qaeda. This was followed by listings by the US State Department and Treasury in 2013 and the UN Security Council in 2014. The UN Security Council designated the group due to its association with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) highlighting the group’s ideological similarities, as well as operational connections “including training and attack planning.”

In 2016, Ansaru leader al-Barnawi was arrested and imprisoned by Nigerian authorities. This coincided with a notable decline in the group’s activities, as between 2014-2017 the group did not claim responsibility for a single attack. Since 2020, the group have had a resurgence, shifting their strategy to more heavily target the Nigerian government and military. Ansaru conducted small-arms attacks against Nigerian military and political targets in northwest Nigeria during 2020, including an attack on 15 January 2020 on the military escort for the Emir from Nigeria’s Yobe State that killed six people.

Reports suggest that in late 2022 Ansaru started working with local bandits who provide the Jihadists with essential manpower and economic resources against the common enemy of the Nigerian security forces, as well as providing them with a source of potential recruits.

The current leadership structure of Ansaru is unknown. However, in an online statement released in January 2022, Ansaru confirmed that it had reasserted its allegiance to AQIM, with the independent sources assessing that Ansaru maintains operational ties to AQIM’s Sahelian branch, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Ansaru has also reportedly maintained ties with Boko Haram, with analysts assessing that Boko Haram and Ansaru remain linked, with Ansaru acting as Boko Haram’s “external operations unit” in its area of operation.

Online activity assessment

Ansaru primarily conducts its online propaganda dissemination via a semi-official pro-Al-Qaeda (AQ) propaganda outlet in conjunction with Ansaru’s affiliated “Media Center”. This announcement was made in January 2022. While the group has not been consistently active since, it retains the capability to exploit pre-existing pathways and processes to disseminate propaganda content.

Ansaru’s content primarily consists of videos, bulletins, photosets, and newsletter and magazine-style publications. Additionally, it is likely that Ansaru publishes content and conducts strategic activities in private online spaces that prohibit non-vetted access.

Alerting Ansaru content

As part of this inclusion expansion, we will be alerting propaganda content via the TCAP that is produced by Ansaru’s official media outlets. This will include videos, photosets, newsletters, and other official content.

This entry is part of a series of monthly blogs dedicated to TCAP expansion, explaining the reasons for inclusion of each new TCAP entity. You can find our full Inclusion Policy, which explains the process and legal grounding we use for deciding which terrorist content we alert here.

[1] Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) is the name used by the group since its inception in 2002. The name Boko Haram originated when neighbours within the state of Maiduguri referred to it as such, roughly translating to “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa. Rather than accurately distilling the group’s core beliefs, “Boko Haram” was a succinct critique and rejection of the group and tends to be used because it is shorter and better known than its proper name. The TCAP already includes JAS within its Inclusion Policy, the reasons for which are explained in this blog.

Source: https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf

[2] Jacob Zenn, Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention, March 2013