TCAP Expansion Profile: Jemaah Islamiyah

• Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is an Islamist terrorist group based in Indonesia, with a history of cells having also operated in the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, Australia, East Timor, and Singapore. The group has carried out deadly terrorist attacks, such as the 2002 Bali bombing that killed 202 people and injured 209.

• JI is designated as a terrorist organisation by 6 designating authorities that inform the TCAP’s inclusion policy: the United Nations, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.[1] JI is known to have operated a fundraising wing, most notably the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI) which is designated by the United Nations and the United States Treasury Department.

• JI’s capability to stage complex attacks has declined significantly. This has coincided with ongoing Indonesian government counterterrorism operations against the group, arrests of key figures, and a shift in the group’s focus towards infiltrating political, social, and religious institutions in Indonesia. However, JI maintains its militant capability and remains a significant terrorist threat.

• JI does not appear to maintain a significant overt online presence. However, this does not preclude the possibility that this will increase in the future through the republishing of old JI content or the production of new propaganda.

Jemaah Islamiyah originated in the 1980s and was founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar. Both leaders were members of Darul Islam, a group which aimed to overthrow the secular Indonesian state in the 1950 and 1960s. JI was founded on an extremist Salafist ideology and has the primary objective of establishing an Islamic Caliphate throughout Southeast Asia. The group is mostly active within Indonesia. JI is known to have operated both military and non-violent wings for fundraising and recruitment, such as the Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI), the self-proclaimed “humanitarian” wing which engaged in fundraising activities. HASI has been designated as a terrorist organisation by the UN, which was based on the financial ties between the two wings. We did not identify any indications that HASI remains a significant component of JI’s fundraising activities.

Figure 1: Attacks attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah, 1970-2020. Source: Global Terrorism Database

In 2002, members of JI carried out a deadly bombing targeting the tourist district of Kuta, Bali, Indonesia which killed 202 people and injured more than 300 others. According to a now-imprisoned JI member complicit in the attack, the bombing targeted the area because it was frequented by “Americans and their associates.”. This was the group’s deadliest attack, which led to numerous international sanctions and designations.

The reform of counter-terrorism practices in Indonesia following the 2002 Bali bombing has led to concentrated operations against the group. Between 2002 and 2009, Indonesia implemented new laws and established a dedicated counter-terrorism police unit. This led to the disruption of JI’s bomb-making capabilities and the arrest of 466 of JI’s members between 2002 and 2009. This sustained pressure caused a decline in JI’s operational capability, which is likely reflected in the lack of complex high-casualty attacks. JI has a long history of internal divisions and organisational fractures along matters of ideology, strategy, and tactics, particularly the use of violence. In July 2014, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) while in prison, which led to a split within JI, with many members of the group drawn to IS. JI remains opposed to IS along ideological grounds, objecting to the practice of Takfir.[2]

From 2009 to 2019, JI appeared to prioritise consolidation and rebuilding its networks, and did not perpetrate major acts of terrorism. This was likely to avoid crackdowns by the Indonesian government, and also likely due to its diminished operational capability. Following a wave of arrests targeting the group’s leadership in 2019, JI has largely shifted its modus operandi away from violence and insurgency and instead towards the infiltration of public institutions, religious movements, and political parties. In 2021, an Indonesian law enforcement operation stated that the group was operating covertly as a legitimate political party named Indonesian People’s Da’wah Party (PDRI). Several members of PDRI including its founder were arrested on suspicion of terrorism.

Despite continual pressure on JI, Indonesian police highlight that the group remains a threat. As of early 2022, 876 members of the group had been arrested; 339 of these arrests occurred in 2021 alone. The arrest of many prominent individuals in the group’s Shura Council in 2021 and 2022 was followed by fresh charges targeting those who coordinated the training of JI members in Syria. These arrests have likely further diminished JI’s online and offline capabilities.

In addition to the Indonesian authorities’ assessment of JI’s significance, the Soufan Center assesses that JI remains a significant terrorist threat, and that the group has displayed an organisational resilience in response to sustained counter-terrorism operations For example, in 2021, authorities disrupted a plot to carry out an attack on Indonesia’s independence day; 53 arrests were subsequently made. Between 2012-2018, JI militants underwent centralised training organised by the group in Java. These militants then travelled to Syria where they trained closely with various groups, including Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Through open-source intelligence (OSINT) investigations, Tech Against Terrorism has identified that Jemaah Islamiyah does not appear to have a significant overt online presence. There are no prominent beacon channels or specific platforms which appear to be targeted by the group or its leadership on an organisational level. Tech Against Terrorism has identified a limited amount of content related to HASI and JI-affiliated media outlets on large tech platforms, however these pages were either no longer active or did not mention JI.

JI previously maintained relationships with numerous offline media outlets and publishing houses that produced a wide range of violent Islamist propaganda. However, these outlets are either no longer active, or do not refer to JI in their content. The majority of this propaganda appears to have been published in print. Multiple publishing outlets previously affiliated with JI now maintain news-style websites, but do not refer to the group. These websites are easily discoverable and accessible through the surface web and standard search engines.

It is realistically possible that, as a result of sustained pressure on JI, any online activities have been targeted by government authorities. However, this does not preclude the possibility that old JI content will be republished online or that new content will be posted by the group.

We will only be alerting content via the TCAP that contains content officially produced by JI, and is clearly branded as such. This will include publications, statements, photosets, and videos. Supporter generated content will not be in scope.

This entry is part of a series of monthly blogs dedicated to TCAP expansion, explaining the reasons for inclusion of each new TCAP entity. You can find our full Inclusion Policy, which explains the process and legal grounding we use for deciding which terrorist content we alert here.

[1] Jemaah Islamiyah is also designated as an illegal network by Indonesia. Other governments in the region such as Singapore and Malaysia draw on the UN designation list as a legal grounding for action against the group.

[2] Takfir is a term used to describe the excommunication of individuals who are considered apostates from Islam. This term has been used by some terrorist groups such as ISIS to justify violence against other Muslims who do not share their extreme interpretation of Islam.